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Abstract Most hospital payment systems based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) 
provide payments for newly approved technologies. In Germany, they are negotiated 
between individual hospitals and health insurances. The aim of our study is to assess the 
functioning of temporary reimbursement mechanisms. We used multilevel logistic 
regression to examine factors at the hospital and state levels that are associated with 
agreeing innovation payments. Dependent variable was whether or not a hospital had 
successfully negotiated innovation payments in 2013 (n=1,532). Using agreement data of the 
yearly budget negotiations between each German hospital and representatives of the health 
insurances, the study comprises all German acute hospitals and innovation payments on all 
diagnoses. In total, 32.9 per cent of the hospitals successfully negotiated innovation 
payments in 2013. We found that the chance of receiving innovation payments increased if 
the hospital was located in areas with a high degree of competition and if they were large, 
had university status and were private for-profit entities. Our study shows an implicit self-
controlled selection of hospitals receiving innovations payments. While implicitly 
encouraging safety of patient care, policy makers should favour a more direct and 
transparent process of distributing innovation payments in prospective payment systems.  
Keywords Technological innovation · Reimbursement of new medical technologies · 
Innovation payments · Hospital financing · Adjustment of DRG system 
JEL Classification  J11 · O33 · H51 · C30 · D78 
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Introduction  
Medical technologies – comprising medical devices, pharmaceuticals, and diagnostic and 
treatment methods – are the cornerstone of modern medicine. While some have contributed 
to substantial improvements in medical outcomes and care, others may even jeopardise 
patients’ safety (Rye and Kimberly 2007). It often takes years to distinguish the latter from 
the former and to determine their performance in routine practice (Callea et al. 2017). Due to 
considerable efforts and risks linked to research and development of medical technologies, 
new products are often more expensive than existing alternatives and are considered a 
decisive factor for high health expenditures (Willemé and Dumont 2015). Public health 
considerations on new technologies thus relate to the triangle of balancing patient access, 
safety and quality, and price setting. Worldwide, policy makers on statutory or insurance 
level, depending on the respective health system, are therefore responsible to weigh the 
potential benefits of ensuring timely access to new medical technologies against the risks of 
doing so in terms of safety and (cost-)effectiveness (Sorenson and Drummond 2014; 
Martelli and van den Brink 2014). The evaluation of a technology’s cost-effectiveness 
allows for clear decion making in the case of increased effectiveness and decreased or equal 
costs compared to comperators (or even equal effectiveness and decreased costs). However, 
reimbursement decisions are more complex and depend on certain health system principles, 
if technologies show an increased effectivesness and higher costs. (Black 1990; Drummond 
et al. 2015). The reimbursement of technologies therefore plays a pivotal role for technology 
utilisation in health care while the particular design of the regulation depends on the kind of 
technology and usually differs between ambulatory and inpatient care.  
Overall, the regulations on technology utilisation and coverage tend to facilitate an adoption 
in inpatient care, leading a majority of new technologies to enter the health system through 
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the inpatient sector (Sorenson and Kanavos 2011). Hospitals have the highest share of 
expenditures in most health systems (Hatz et al. 2017), making technology adoption in 
inpatient care highly relevant from a system perspective. However, the immediate decision 
on the utilisation of respective medical technologies in inpatient care is taken on hospital 
level, where the seemingly same conditions cause some providers to adopt a new technology 
but others do not (Sorenson and Kanavos 2011, Greenhalgh et al. 2004; Torbica and 
Cappellaro 2010). High expenditures and increasing financial pressures such as prospective 
payment systems have led to an increased economic pressure for hospitals. A variety of 
studies have explored incentives of prospective payment systems and their effects on 
technology adoption while controlling for hospital characteristics. Results suggest that DRG 
payments incentivise hospitals to utilise those technologies that lead to lower costs per 
patient, while they negatively affect cost increasing new technologies (Romeo et al 1984; 
Kesteloot and Voet 1998; Lee and Waldman 1985; Scheller-Kreinsen, Quentin, and Busse 
2011).  
With the aim to balance these financial disincentives for technologies that are currently not 
covered by health insurances − due to the time lack when introducing technologies in DRG-
systems − policy stakeholders use additional payment instruments to finance certain 
innovative technologies cost-neutrally. Studies investigating the utilisation of innovation 
payments in individual countries showed that these payments are overall correlated with 
adopting innovations (Bech et al. 2009; Bäumler 2013; Sorenson, Drummond, and 
Wilkinson 2013; Wilkinson and Drummond 2014). To explore the effect of innovation 
payments, most of these studies investigate the uptake of one specific technology by the 
respective hospital departments in a certain region. However, many innovation payments are 
not paid to every hospital offering the service, but only to some providers based on 
negotiations. This is especially the case for separate payments and funding for cost outliers 
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(Scheller-Kreinsen, Quentin, and Busse 2011). As most of the previous studies analysed data 
regarding one medical device in one indication, our study evaluates a nationwide data set 
comprising all acute hospitals and the innovation payments for all diagnoses. More 
precisely, we aim at identifying factors at hospital and state levels that are associated with 
the agreement of innovation payments in German acute inpatient care as organisations are 
placed within special environments. 
Background: Innovation payments in Germany 
Hospitals in Germany are permitted to use a newly approved technology before its benefits 
have been systematically assessed. This does not mean, however, that they will be 
reimbursed for its use. It takes approximately three years until a new technology is 
integrated in the DRG classification depending on the time when a new procedure code is 
established and depending on data availability to create a new DRG (Federal Association of 
Statutory Health Insurance Funds 2016). Recognising that this time lag could hinder the 
adoption of potentially beneficial new technologies, policy-makers in Germany – as in many 
countries with DRG systems – have developed a system of innovation payments to provide 
additional funding for some of these technologies, if the price is above the existing DRG 
tariffs in inpatient care (Levaggi, Moretto, and Pertile 2014; Scheller-Kreinsen, Quentin, and 
Busse 2011; Sorenson et al. 2015). This system was established in 2005 and involves so-
called ‘NUB payments,’ named after the German acronym for ‘New Diagnostic and 
Treatment Methods’ (Neue Untersuchungs- und Behandlungsmethoden, Section 6(2) 
KHEntgG, Hospital Payment Act). From an international perspective, NUB payments can 
be classified as payments that are separate from the DRG system, involve additional funding 
(i.e., are paid on fee-for-service basis) and are negotiated locally (Sorenson, Drummond, and 
Wilkinson 2013; Scheller-Kreinsen, Quentin, and Busse 2011). We will refer to NUB 
payments as ‘innovation payments’ due to internationally different terms. 
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The process to receive the innovation payment consists of two-steps. In a first step, a 
hospital submits a request to the German Institute for the Hospital Remuneration System 
(InEK, Institut für das Entgeltsystem im Krankenhaus). In its request, the hospital describes 
(1) the new technology and the features making it beneficial for patients, (2) the patients 
being treated, (3) additional staff and material costs and (4) the reason why the costs of the 
new technology are not appropriately covered by existing DRG tariffs. If the InEK decides 
that the technology satisfies the criteria for innovation payments, it designates the 
technology ‘Status 1.’ In a second step, the hospital may subsequently negotiate a payment 
with representatives of the health insurances (Institut für das Entgeltsystem im Krankenhaus 
2015). This can take place as part of, or separately from, the annual budget negotiations 
between the hospital and the health insurances in the state within which the hospital is 
located. Health insurances are, however, not obliged to agree on a payment. The negotiated 
budget and innovation payments are valid for all insured patients treated at that hospital; this 
includes all statutory health insurances (SHI) as well as all private health insurances 
(Loskamp et al. 2017). Henschke et al. give a detailed introduction into this regulatory 
pathway (Henschke et al. 2010). 
Innovation payments in Germany have received little research attention. To date, two 
commercial reports have used questionnaires and expert interviews to explore the 
importance hospitals attach to innovation payments. One of these reports, commissioned by 
the German Medical Technology Association (BVMed), concluded that primarily university 
hospitals, large hospitals and hospitals with a medical specialisation considered innovation 
payments as relevant funding source. The authors estimated that 40 per cent of the payment 
requests that received approval for negotiations ultimately agreed a payment successfully 
with the health insurances (Blum and Offermanns 2009). The authors of the second report 
commissioned by Pfizer Pharma GmbH, assessed based on a qualitative survey that 
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hospitals valued innovation payments not only for financial reasons but as a marketing 
instrument for hospitals’ innovativeness. Based on these findings, innovation payments were 
suggested to be especially relevant for large non-university hospitals (Wilke 2007). 
However, we were unable to identify any studies that analysed secondary countrywide data 
to explore which factors might affect the likelihood of a hospital and health insurances 
contractually agreeing innovation payments.  
Theoretical framework 
Particularly in times of an increasing pace of innovations technology adoption is a carefully 
considered decision (Lettieri and Masella 2009). Decision making is exacerbated by 
financial pressures based on the introduction of innovation payments. Identifying factors that 
explain differences in hospitals’ adoption behaviour plays an important role in adoption 
research (Greenhalgh et al. 2004; Torbica and Cappellaro 2010; Sorenson and Kanavos 
2011). According to our specific aim that focuses on examining hospitals’decision with 
regard to aggreeing innovation payments, Rogers’ Innovation-Diffusion Theory, used in a 
variety of research fields, is used as theoretical framework. It may be one of the most 
influential work to understand the comprehensive structure of adopting innovations, 
identifying three main sources that influence the adoption of innovations, namely the 
perception of innovation characteristics, the adopter characteristics and contextual 
determinants also known as environmental determinants (Rogers 2003, first published in 
1962). Rogers additionally defines the steps of the decision making process as knowledge, 
persuasion, decision, implementation and confirmation (Rogers 2003). In the context of 
large complex organisations this is accompagnied by the division of duties as each step of 
technology adoption and assimilation may be executed by different people (Sáenz-Royo, 
Gracia-Lázaro, and Moreno 2015), such as the treating physicians, chief physicians, hospital 
managers and controlling personnel (Kimberly and Evanisko 1981). The entity hospital as 
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organisation therefore despicts interactions beween different individuals. Furthermore, 
adoption theory suggests that technology adoption in hospitals depends on the kind of 
technology (Greer 1985). This is an important issue when focussing on different kinds of 
technologies. However, when focusing on medical technologies that are utilised in direct 
patient care – so called ‘medical-individualistic’ technologies in Greer’s terms and that 
additionally exhibit similar characteristics such as being not adequately captured by DRG 
systems due to their novelty, technology characteristics might be neglected. We therefore 
focus on the role of organisational and environmantal determinants that play an essential 
role in technology adoption of hospitals (McCullough 2008).  
Organisational determinants of adopting innovations have been widely investigated. 
Previous research showed that internal organisational characteristics are associated with the 
adoption of innovations (Kimberly and Evanisko 1981, Greenhalgh 2004, Rye and Kimberly 
2007, Varabyova et al. 2017). From the perspective of restricted resources, larger hospitals 
tend to have more complex resources in terms of technical equipment available in that 
hospital, and a better technological know-how (Weng et al 2011). Additionally, there might 
be differences in the hospital’s stance on new technologies. Large hospitals generally 
employ more administrative staff and have a separate finance and performance directorate 
(Blank and Valdmanis 2015). Considering their regional importance, they may have a 
stronger negotiating position than smaller hospitals and may therefore be more successful at 
agreeing innovation payments.We therfore hypothesise that agreements on innovation 
payments will be positively influenced by hospital size.  
Being a university hospital is likely to be associated with a greater willingness to adopt and 
develop new technologies given their teaching and research mission (Weng et al. 2006). 
With regard to the utilization rate of new technologies, Mitchell and colleagues found that 
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the proportion of MR imaging was higher in teaching hospitals compared to non-teaching 
hospitals (Mitchell et al. 2002). Furthermore, evidence suggests that university hospitals 
may have a strong negotiating position with the health insurances (White, Reschovsky, and 
Bond 2014; Bäumler 2013; Blum and Offermanns 2009). We therefore hypothesise that 
aggreements on innovation payments will be positively associated with the university status 
of a hospital.  
As the mission of an organisation may affect strategic decision making with regard to the 
adoption of innovative technologies, for profit organisations are the most market-orientated 
providers. Consequently, they may have higher incentives to use new technologies with the 
aim of attracting more patients (Banaszak-Holl 1996). In the context of successful 
agreements on innovation payments, we hypothesise that for-profit hospitals have greater 
incentives to agree innovations payments due to their market orientation. However, evidence 
on the relationship between hospital ownership and the uptake of new technologies is 
mixed. The findings of several studies suggest that private for-profit hospitals adopt new 
technologies faster than other providers (Bäumler 2013), while Bech et al. (2009) could not 
show that a higher share of private hospital beds was positively associated with procedure 
rates for new technologies.  
There is some evidence to suggest that the uptake of new technologies may be associated 
with the specialisation of hospitals (Augurzky, Pilny, and Wübker 2015; Bonastre et al. 
2014; Blum and Offermanns 2009). However one has to bear in mind, that hospitals are 
considered as specialised in different ways. (I) If a hospital treats a large share of cases in 
one field (Herwartz and Strumann 2012; Daidone and D’Amico 2009; Lindlbauer and 
Schreyögg 2014; Kim et al. 2015) it might be specialised due the concentration of cases in 
terms of a narrow range of services. (II) Hospitals with cases assigned to a high degree of 
 Reimbursement of New Technologies in DRG systems  10 
 
severity are also considered to be specialised (Farley and Hogan 1990; Zwanziger, Melnick, 
and Simonson 1996; Bonastre et al. 2014). There are intensive discussions in scientific 
research as the first definition might not adequately explain specialisation, e.g. when using 
the hospital level. University hospitals may have many cases in one clinical field while their 
share of cases compared to all other cases might be small. We therefore expect a negative 
association for specialisation in terms of concentration which is defined according to the 
range of services. Regarding a hospital’s specialisation in terms of a high degree of severity, 
one can assume that the uptake of new technologies tends to be quicker and more 
comprehensive in university hospitals compared to a general hospital, making it worthwhile 
for the former to apply for extra funding. We hypothesise that a high severity level is 
associated with agreeing innovations payments. 
Environmental determinants  
In addition, a high degree of competition in the vicinity of a hospital may act as an incentive 
to adopt new technologies (Castro et al. 2014; Blank and Valdmanis 2015). Many studies 
also analyse effects of competition on hospitals’ patient volume, average length of stay, 
costs of care, and efficiency (Robinson and Luft 1985, Schmid and Ulrich 2012, Tiemann et 
al. 2012). The regulatory and competitive environment in the German hospital sector has 
been part of consolidation and reorganisation processes (Schmid and Ulrich 2012). 
Overcapacities in urban areas result in increasing competitive pressure (Tiemann and 
Schreyögg 2009). Therefore, it is likely to assume that high competition leads to successful 
negotiations of innovation payments to further increase hospitals’ competitiveness in terms 
of attracting more patients. Robinson and Luft concluded that higher costs of hospitals 
operating in highly competetive areas have been a result of higher demand in wealthy areas 
for technologically sophisticated and expensive clinical medicine (Robinson and Luft 1985).  
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Lastly, the bed occupancy rate is a measure of the overall supply of and demand for hospital 
services within a state (Dayhoff and Cromwell 1993). It is the share of occupied inpatient 
bed days divided by the available inpatient bed days over a year in each state. With regard to 
innovation payments, hospitals in a state with a low bed occupancy rate might have a greater 
incentive to offer additional services compared to a hospital with a high occupancy rate and 
thus request more funding.  
While German innovation payments are regulated by federal law, we assume they are 
implemented differently in each of Germany’s 16 federal states. Indeed, decisions on 
hospital planning and financing are the responsibility of the states rather than of the federal 
government. Hospitals’ operational costs are covered primarily by DRG payments made by 
statutory and private health insurers while capital investment is primarily financed from state 
budgets. Furthermore, the representatives of health insurances responsible for negotiating 
innovation payments differ between states. In short, hospitals in Germany operate within a 
state-specific financial and political context. We hypothesise that the variation in hospitals 
agreeing innovation payments can in part be explained by hospitals being clustered in the 16 
states in Germany because of distinct financial and political circumstances. 
With these points in mind, we hypothesise that: 
a) the odds of agreeing innovation payments with health insurances vary considerably 
among hospitals; 
b) this variation can be explained in part by hospital characteristics; and  
c) in part by hospitals being clustered in the 16 states in Germany because of distinct 
financial and political circumstances. 
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Materials and methods 
Data 
We conducted an empirical analysis of all acute hospitals operating within the G-DRG 
system. The data set was compiled by the Scientific Institute of the AOK (WIdO, 
Wissenschaftliches Institut der AOK) as an appendix to its annual hospital report in 2015 
(Klauber et al. 2015). The data stem mainly from the annual hospital budget agreements. 
The WIdO supplemented this data set with data from quality assurance records and e-mails 
that the health insurances must send to InEK to inform it that an innovation payment has 
been agreed. 
The data set encompasses all acute hospitals that treat patients insured by health insurance – 
i.e. hospitals forming part of the hospital plans of the states and hospitals with provision 
contracts. In the data, a hospital is defined as the entity with which a budget agreement has 
been made. In cases where a chain or network of hospitals within one state is registered as 
one institution (i.e., with just one institutional code), it is considered to be one hospital. We 
obtained data on variables at the state level from the German Federal Statistical Office. All 
data are presented for the year 2013. We used Stata 12.1 to estimate our regression model. 
Model specification 
The outcome variable in our statistical model was dichotomous, assuming a value of 1 if one 
or more innovation payments were successfully negotiated between a hospital and the health 
insurances in 2013 and 0 otherwise. We undertook a multilevel analysis with hospitals 
clustered in states to consider the distinct financial and political contexts within which 
hospitals operate in a state. Based on the dimensions relevant for technology adoption, we 
considered relevant covariates corresponding to the organisational and the environmental 
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dimensions. We estimated the following explanatory variables measured on hospital and 
state level, derivered from the framework described above (see Table 1).  
Table 1. Explanatory variables by dimension 
 Organisational dimension Environmental dimension 
Hospital level 
University hospital  Competition 
Hospital size  
Ownership  
Range of services (Specialisation I)  
Severity of disease (Specialisation II)   
State level  Bed occupancy  
 
We operationalised the explanatory variables as decribed in the following. The variable 
university status is dichotomous in our model, assuming a value of 1 if a hospital had 
university status and 0 if not.  
Hospital size is operationalised by the number of hospital beds (<50; 50-199; 200-499; 500-
999; ≥1000 beds), with the smallest category serving as reference. In line with the German 
Federal Statistical Office (DESTATIS), we distinguish between three types of hospital 
ownership (Bölt et al. 2012) by including two dummy variables, one for not-for-profit and 
one for private for-profit ownership, with public ownership as the reference category.  
Since specialisation is not observable but needs to be interpreted from other data, there have 
been various attempts to find proxy variables to measure specialisation: The information 
theory index (ITI) and the gini coefficient of the hospital’s major diagnostic categories or 
DRGs consider a hospital specialised when it treats a large share of cases in one field, 
focussing on the relative number of patient cases (Herwartz and Strumann 2012; Daidone 
and D’Amico 2009; Lindlbauer and Schreyögg 2014; Kim et al. 2015). Besides that, a 
distance measure of a hospital’s case mix index, depicting the distance from a hospital’s 
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level of severity to a baseline, has been used to measure specialisation in terms of severity 
level. Hospitals with cases assigned to a higher degree of severity compared to a baseline are 
considered to be specialised following this definition (Farley and Hogan 1990; Zwanziger, 
Melnick, and Simonson 1996; Bonastre et al. 2014). Selecting an appropriate measurement 
thus depends on the contextual notion of specialisation. In the context of adoption decisions 
of new technologies, we use both definitions:(I) the specialisation as the concentration in 
terms of a narrow range of services and (II) the level of severity of the treated cases. To 
account for (I) the range of services within a hospital, the Gini coefficient measures the 
extent to which a hospital’s distribution of base DRGs deviates from an equal distribution of 
the entire catalogue of base DRGs (Klauber et al. 2015; Augurzky, Pilny, and Wübker 
2015). The Gini coefficient assumes values between 0 and 1, with higher values suggesting a 
higher degree of specialisation (narrow range of services). A Gini coefficient of 0 would 
mean that a hospital’s services are spread evenly across all base DRGs and the hospital 
would be considered unspecialised (wide range of services). In contrast, a Gini coefficient of 
1 would indicate a maximum degree of specialisation as all services would be assigned to 
one base DRG. To account for (II) a hospital’s level of severity we assume that hospitals 
with a higher case-mix index have a higher level of sophistication. We thus measure this as 
distance of the hospital’s case mix index deviating from the state mean (≥+20%, 10% to 
19.99%, 0% to 9.99%, 0% to -9.99%, -10% to -19.99%, <-20%).  
In addition, the degree of competition in commercial markets is measured by the use of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). By summing the squared market shares of all hospitals 
within a radius of 10 kilometres, the HHI represents not only the number of competitors 
within a market but also “the equity of distribution of market share” (Sethi et al. 2013). The 
HHI ranges from 0 (highly competitive) to 1 (monopoly).  
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Lastly, the bed occupancy rate is reflected by the share of occupied inpatient bed days 
divided by the available inpatient bed days over a year in each state.  
Statistical analysis 
We estimated two-level logistic regression models with state-level fixed effects (random 
intercept models) to consider clustering of hospitals within states. State-level variance in 
agreed innovation payments was assessed by estimating an unconditioned model (null 
model). It may be written as: 
(1)                             
where     is the dependent variable (subscript i referring to the hospital and subscript j to the 
state), ßo is the intercept and uj the state-level random effect, assumed to be independent 
from one another and normally distributed with a mean of zero.  
In the next step, we added the explanatory variables to the model: 
(2)                                                        
                                
                    
where ßo is the intercept, ß1-ß6 are hospital parameters and ß7 is a state parameter associated 
with the covariates, and uj the random error for the state level. We conducted the Hausman 
test with the bed occupancy variable as random effect to determine that the fixed effect does 
not capture a part of the bed occupancy. According the results do not justify using random 
effects. The goodness of fit of the models was compared using the likelihood ratio test, 
estimating how much more probable the data was in the fitted model compared to the null 
model.  
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Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Our analysis included 1,358 hospitals in Germany, for which we had complete data on the 
chosen variables. Of all the hospitals in our sample, 2.7 per cent had university status. The 
most common hospitals were those with 200 to 499 beds (37.2 per cent) and with not-for-
profit ownership (41.3 per cent). Table 2 gives a summary of the descriptive statistics. 
Table 2. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics (n=1358) 
Variable 
(dimension*) 
Categories / Definition n / min-max 
Percentage / 
Mean(s.d.) 
Innovation payment Hospitals without innovation payments in 2013 
Hospitals with innovation payments in 2013 
911 
447 
67.08% 
32.92% 
Hospital level: 
University hospital  
(OD) 
Not a university hospital 
University hospital  
1321 
37 
97.28% 
2.72% 
Hospital size  
(OD) 
< 50 beds 
50-199 beds 
200-499 beds 
500-999 beds 
≥ 1000 beds 
291 
316 
505 
184 
62 
21.43% 
23.27% 
37.19% 
13.55% 
4.57% 
Ownership  
(OD) 
Not-for-profit 
Public 
Private for-profit 
561 
448 
349 
41.31% 
32.99% 
25.70% 
Range of services, 
Specialisation I  
(OD)  
Gini coefficient of hospital’s base DRGs (x10), 
categorised in quintiles 
6.55-9.98 8.72 (0.78) 
Severity of disease,  
Specialisation II  
(OD) 
Distance function of hospital’s case mix index 
deviating from state mean 
≥20.00% 
10.00%-19.99% 
0.00%-9.99% 
-10.00%- -0.01% 
-20.00%- -10.01%  
<-20% 
 
 
222 
71 
143 
274 
346 
351 
 
 
15.78% 
5.05% 
10.16% 
19.47% 
24.59% 
24.95% 
Competition  
(ED) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of other hospitals 
within a radius of 10 km 
0.12-1 0.67 (0.30) 
State level: 
Bed occupancy  
(ED) 
Bed occupancy rate (in %) 73.4-87.2 77.45 (2.23) 
Note: Hospitals were included in the study if details on all considered categories were available in the hospital 
index (information was missing in 174 out of 1532 cases. 
*Dimension: Variables and dimensions are part of table 1. OD: Organisational dimention, ED: Environmental 
dimension 
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In total, 32.9 per cent of the hospitals in our sample agreed one or more innovation payments 
with the health insurances in 2013 (447 of 1,358 hospitals). Of the university hospitals, 91.9 
per cent successfully negotiated innovation payments compared to 31.3 per cent of the non-
university hospitals.  
The share of hospitals that successfully negotiated innovation payments varied considerably 
among the states. In Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland, for example, 10.0 per cent of 
hospitals agreed innovation payments with the health insurances. At the other end of the 
spectrum is the city-state of Bremen, where 75.0 per cent of hospitals successfully 
negotiated innovation payments that same year. Figure I gives descriptive statistics on the 
variation among the 16 states in Germany. 
Figure I. Percentage of hospitals in each of Germany’s 16 states that agreed innovation 
payments with the sickness funds in 2013 
 Reimbursement of New Technologies in DRG systems  18 
 
Factors that explain the agreement of innovation payments 
We estimated a null model (Model I) first to test our observation of clustering on state level. 
The estimate for the intercept produces a mean of 0.38 (95% CI 0.18-0.82) and the 
intraclass-correlation coefficient, calculated as the ratio of the between-variance to the total 
variance, is 0.042. This coefficient suggests that observations of hospitals within the same 
region are not fully independent from one another but clustered in states. As even small 
levels of dependence can lead to biased results (Cohen 2010), we chose to investigate 
variation between the states in our further models by including state-specific explanatory 
variables. We added the hospital and state variables into the analysis in the next step (Model 
II). The detailed results of our two regression models are provided in Table 3. 
When the other variables were held constant, the status as university hospital was associated 
with an odds ratio of 4.30 (95% CI 1.00-18.47) compared to non-university hospitals. 
Furthermore, large hospitals had greater odds of agreeing innovation payments compared to 
small hospitals. The odds ratio rose as the number of beds increased, reaching 30.35 (95% 
CI 8.01-115.01) for hospitals with at least 1000 beds compared to hospitals with fewer than 
50 beds (reference). The odds of agreeing innovation payments were lower for public 
hospitals (0.69, 95% CI 0.47-1.02) and slightly lower for private for-profit hospitals (0.96, 
95% CI 0.63-1.47) than for not-for-profit hospitals. The Gini coefficient of base DRGs (OR 
0.38; 95% CI 0.24-0.59 second quintile compared to first quintile) suggests that the odds of 
agreeing innovation payments decreases with increasing centralisation in services. Opposed 
to this, we estimate a positive correlation between hospitals with a higher case-mix index 
than state mean and the chance of successfully negotiating innovation payments. Estimating 
the influence of competition and market share on the agreement of innovation payments 
resulted in an odds ratio of 0.43 (95% CI 0.24-0.78).  
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On state level, the bed occupancy rate was also negatively associated with agreeing 
innovation payments. The estimated odds ratio of 0.96 (95% CI 0.83-1.11) suggests that the 
odds of agreeing innovation payments decreases by 0.04 for each per cent that the bed 
occupancy rate increases. 
Table 3. Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals for hospitals agreeing innovation 
payments in 2013 
Variable 
Model I (null model)   Model II 
OR 95% CI   OR 95% CI 
Hospital level:       
University hospital        
   Not a university hospital - -   Reference Reference 
   University hospital  - -   4.30* 1.00-18.47 
Hospital size       
   < 50 beds - -   Reference Reference 
   < 200 beds - -   1.68 0.95-2.96 
   < 500 beds - -   4.34*** 2.39-7.89 
   < 1000 beds - -   10.37*** 5.00-21.47 
   ≥ 1000 beds - -   30.35*** 8.01-115.01 
Ownership       
   Not-for-profit - -   Reference Reference 
   Public - -   0.69 0.47-1.02 
   Private for-profit - -   0.96 0.63-1.47 
Range of services 
(Specialisation I) 
- -     
   1st quintile gini      Reference Reference 
   2nd quintile gini     0.38*** 0.24-0.59 
   3rd quintile gini      0.21*** 0.12-0.35 
   4th quintile gini     0.25*** 0.14-0.45 
   5th quintile gini     0.16*** 0.08-0.31 
Severity of disease 
(Specialisation II)  
- -     
   ≥ 20.00%     Reference Reference 
   10.00% - 19.99%     1.38 0.68-2.79 
   0.00% - 9.99%     0.77 0.41-1.44 
   -10.00% - -0.01%     0.73 0.42-1.27 
   -20.00% - -10.01%     0.48** 0.28-0.83 
   < -20%     0.30*** 0.17-0.52 
Competition - -   0.43** 0.24-0.78 
State level:       
Bed occupancy - -   0.96 0.83-1.11 
_constant 0.49*** 0.38-0.62   8.96e11* 49.48-1.62e22 
Level 2 intercept variance 0.38* 0.18-0.82   0.71 0.44-1.15 
AIC 1716.15   1257.27 
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p≤0.05 
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Discussion 
One criterion for the success of health systems is their ability to innovate. Health policy 
making thus balances patient access, safety and quality of innovative health technologies, 
based on coverage decisions and price setting mechanisms. The implementation of 
temporary innovation payments aimed at balancing the disincentive of prospective payment 
systems to use new more expensive technologies compared to those integrated in the current 
DRG system (Scheller-Kreinsen, Quentin, and Busse 2011). In order to assess in how far 
policy making achieves the aim to bridge the gap between the introduction of a new medical 
technology and its reimbursement through DRGs, we examined hospital and state variables 
that might be associated with receiving innovation payments. Each variable is assigned to 
the organisational and environmental dimension of Rogers’ framework (Rogers 2003). 
However, variables of the product dimension which are also a part of Rogers’ framework 
were not included in analyses as technologies concerned exhibit similar characteristics such 
as being not adequately captured by DRG systems due to their novelty.  
The results show that hospitals with certain characteristics of the organisational and 
environmental dimension have a higher likelihood to access innovation payments as 
additional source of financing than others. In accordance with literature on this subject, a 
substantial share of the variance was explained on hospital level and a smaller one on state 
level. We found that hospitals had greater odds to agree innovation payments if they were 
large, had university status and were located in a region with high competition, which is 
consistent with previous studies (Bäumler 2013; Bech et al. 2009; Blum and Offermanns 
2009). One explanation for the effect of hospital size may be found in the ability of larger 
hospitals to employ more staff skilled in medical finance and performance, facilitating the 
elaborate process of requesting innovation payments. For smaller hospitals, it may be more 
efficient to avoid this process altogether and use new technologies only in exceptional cases 
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and without adequate reimbursement. Moreover, it is plausible that larger hospitals and 
university hospitals have more power to negotiate innoation payments (Blum and 
Offermanns 2009). Additionally, university hospitals are commissioned to undertake 
teaching and research activities (as described in the individual state laws). The positive 
relationship between innovation payments and the level of competition in a hospital’s 
vicinity suggests that the presence of competing hospitals may serve as incentive to offer 
new procedures and technologies. This complements the notion that the demand for, and use 
of, medical services increase with their supply (Schreyögg et al. 2014; Nolting et al. 2011). 
One explanation may be that innovation payments serve as a marketing instrument, allowing 
hospitals to stand apart from their regional competitors. Because it has been an explicit 
political goal to foster competition in the German health system, these effects can be 
classified as intended consequences of the payment instrument (Knieps 2009).  
We hypothesised that when a hospital serves as a specialist centre for a certain diagnosis, 
this specialisation might be linked to the use of new technologies. Our estimations suggest 
that the odds of agreeing innovation payments were lower for hospitals with a narrow range 
of services (i.e. high concentration of cases). One reason may be that a centralisation of a 
hospital’s services on very few DRGs entails that there are only few innovation payments 
eligible for funding. There may be years in which no innovation payment exists for this area 
of specialisation. However, this information is not included in our data set. As the Gini 
coefficient only focuses on centralisation, hospitals with a wide range of services but with a 
high level of severity in some of their fields may be specialised despite a low Gini 
coefficient, such as some university hospitals. We thus also estimated the effect of hospitals’ 
level of severity through the hospital case mix index as distance from the state mean. 
Hospitals treating more severe patient cases are more likely to agree innovation payments. 
Interestingly, after adjusting for case-mix, the chance to agree innovation payments is 
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slightly smaller for private for-profit hospitals than for not-for-profit hospitals. If the 
regression is not adjusted for the case-mix index, however, private hospitals seem to adopt 
innovation payments faster, which is actually due to a larger average case-mix (Bonastre et 
al. 2014). 
Overall, the results suggest that variables of the organisational dimension (e.g. university 
status, hospital size) and the environmental dimension (e.g. competition, bed occupancy) are 
associated with negotiating innovation payments. In particular, hospitals in rural areas with a 
low competition and those with a low bed occupancy do not adopt new technologies in the 
same way as hospitals in an area of high hospital competition and a high bed occupancy. 
Patient access to new technologies can thus be restricted in rural areas with few competing 
hospitals in the vicinity and in small hospitals. Hospitals may not innovate due to 
uncertainities and risk combined with the use of new medical devices, e.g. limited skills and 
a lack of experience that might cause risks for patients and users (Altenstetter 1996).  
The effects of variables might be politically desired: Especially large hospitals and those 
with research focus negotiated innovation payments. Due to their responsibility for testing 
new therapies at an early point in time and because of their elaborate medical hierarchies 
and structures, patient safety may in average be higher if new technologies are utilised and 
reimbursed in large and university hospitals first. In addition, when a new technology is 
used frequently by one entity, adverse effects and dangers may faster become evident. This 
is especially relevant since requirements for market access are relatively low for medical 
devices in the European Union (Hatz et al. 2017). This raises the question in how far new 
technologies should be assessed regarding patient value in terms of effectiveness and safety 
issues while being reimbursed through innovation payments. Starting in 2016, the German 
government has implemented an early benefit assessment for certain procedures, when an 
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innovation payment is requested. The federal joint committee now assesses the clinical 
effectiveness, risks and potentials for highly invasive procedures using “high-risk” medical 
devices (i.e. medical device of risk class IIb or III or active implantable medical devices 
exhibiting a novel theoretical-scientific concept) and decides if patient value has been 
proven sufficiently.  
Besides these results, our study has certain limitations regarding the data set. First, regarding 
the dependent variable, a more robust analysis would be possible if more details on the 
number of technologies accepted for payments were available. Additionally, details on the 
number of innovations payments per hospital, the number of applications per hospital, and 
the process and outcomes of hospitals‘ annual budget negotiations would contribute to an 
analysis considering more specific variables. However, these data are not publicly available. 
Nevertheless, to our knowledge, this data set is the best available resource covering a 
nationwide data set of innovation payments. Furthermore, it is the first study using a 
nationwide data set that includes all hospitals being allowed to negotiate innovation 
payments with health insurers, i.e. all technologies assessed positively in the process of 
innovations payment are included. While it is unlikely that a hospital would incorrectly 
record to have received a payment when it had not, it is conceivable that the receipt of an 
innovation payment is not always included in a hospital’s records of its main budget 
negotiations because innovation payments can be agreed outside of these. To correct for this, 
the WIdO used data from quality assurance records and the e-mails that health insurances 
must send to InEK to inform it that innovation payments have been agreed with a hospital to 
verfify the information on innovation payments. Based on these limitations and based on the 
fact that health insurances are not obliged to negotiate innovation payments, our outcome 
variable captures two steps: (1) a hospital’s successful request to InEK allowing it to 
negotiate a payment and (2) the successfully negotiation of a payment with the health 
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insurances. Lastly, due to the limitations of the data set, we were unable to consider 
interactions beween different individuals within the entity of hospitals as an organisation. 
Since most countries with DRG systems use some form of time-limited innovation payments 
to encourage innovation and improve access to new technologies, we recommend that 
similar studies be conducted in other countries, preferably using data from all hospitals and 
all diagnoses, to research the matter in other prospective payment systems. As innovation 
payments are time-limited and most new technologies are integrated into the DRG system 
over time by splitting DRGs or introducing supplementary payments, further studies should 
investigate the link between innovation payments and permanent reimbursement in relation 
to the technology’s benefits. 
Conclusion 
Evidence shows that remuneration systems such as the DRG system affect decision making 
of hospitals. In order to balance timely utilisation of new technologies and cost coverage, 
policy makers use temporary innovation payments to compensate disincentives inherent in 
the DRG system. Our findings shed light on the effect of hospital and state characteristics 
for agreeing innovation payments in German inpatient care. We thereby reveal implicit 
incentives of the reimbursement mechanism. The results might be of interest for the German 
government as well as for stakeholders in the context of prospective payment systems.  
Key findings of this study are that policy making generally compensates disincentives of the 
DRG system by disbursing innovation payments. Patient safety may be implicitly fostered 
by favouring university hospitals and large hospitals to use new technologies. However, the 
innovation payments may impede patient access in rural areas since hospitals in regions with 
low competition have a smaller chance to receive innovation payments. This shows that the 
tradeoff between patient access and safety requires an adequate balance, which could be 
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incentivised by financing mechanisms. Our study shows an implicit self-controlled selection 
of hospitals receiving innovations payments. Policy makers should instead choose a more 
direct and transparent process of distributing innovation payments in prospective payment 
systems. They should probably consider which hospitals are most suitable to generate 
further evidence on the effectiveness of new medical technologies to link safety issues with 
patient access regarding the use of new medical technologies.  
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